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IN THF! RUPRPME COTJP.,., OF THP. S'!'ATB OF' TTTAJ-l 
THF. RTA'I'B OF tlTAR, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ERVIN BRAFFORD, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF' RF.SP0NDP.N.,., 
Case No. 101 79 
STATEMEN'r' 0F THF. NATURF. OF '!1HE CASF. 
Appellant was charged by information with aggravated 
robbery in violation of Utah Corle Ann., ~ 76-6-302 (lqi.:;3), as 
amerrled; and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person in violation of TJtah Corle Ann., § 70-10-503 (1953), as 
amended. 
n IS PO s I TI ON IN TH P. LOWP. :R cnu RT 
Appellant, following a jury trial on November 30 and 
December 1, 1981, in the Third Judicial District Court in anfl 
for Salt Lake County, tTtah, the Honorable Peter F'. Leary, 
Judge, presiding, was found guilty of aggravated robbery and 
possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. nn 
December 21, 1981, appellant was sentenced to the Utah state 
Prison for an indeterminate term of five years to life for 
aggravated robbery and an indeterminate term of one to fifteen 
years for possession of a rlangerous weapon by a restricted 
person; the sentences to run concurrently. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RBL IEF SOU<';HT ON APPF.:Af, 
Respondent seeks a judgment and order of this Court 
affirming the jury's verdict and sentences imposed. 
STA'r'F.HP,NT OF PACTS 
:Robert Hunter, pharmacist at Southeast PharJTtacy in 
Salt Lake County, on May 11, 1981, was robhed by two men who 
absconded with the pharmacy's prescription drugs and money. 
At trial, Mr. Hunter testified that one man entered the 
pharmacy carrying a gun and ordered him to lie on the floor 
while he, the first robber, searched for all Schedule A 
narcotics, consisting for the most part of "severe pain 
killers and sleeping pills" ('!'. 135). With Hunter, the 
victim, lying on the floor, a second robber, appellant, 
entered the pharmacy ('!'. 135). Hunter instructed both robbers 
where such narcotics could be found ( '1". 111:\). After both 
robbers stated that they were not finding the drugs which they 
desired, Hunter offered to assist them by going through the 
shelves of the pharmacy (T. 136). Hunter placed the drugs 
into a brown valise (T. 136) held by the robber with the gun, 
while appellant opened the cash register which triggered the 
pharmacy's alarm system (~. 117) and activated a camera 
located on the north wal 1 of the pharmacy overlooking the 
prescription department (T. 13q). The resulting photographs 
of that occasion accurately depict the two robhers with Mr. 
Runter during a certain period of time of the robbery. 
Although Hunter testified that he was unable to 
identify appellant, he din remember that appellant was wearing 
-?.-
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what seemed to be a belted vest (T. lnl). Hunter further 
testified that the reason he could not identify appellant was 
he was concentrating exclusively on placing the drugs in the 
bag (~. 161). Positive identification of appellant, as one of 
the pharmacy's two robbers, however, was made by Ken Brown, a 
parole officer who haa known appellant since 1Q79 (T. 169). 
On the basis of this evidence, the jury found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of aggravated 
robbery and possession of a firearm by a restricted person. 
ARGUMF.NT 
P0IN':!:' I 
THE EVIDP.NCF. HAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THF 
VERDICT. 
Recently, this Court heln it will not overturn a 
jury verdict in a criminal case only if the evidence is so 
insubstantial that a reasonable man could not have reached the 
conclusion that the accused was guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In State v. Johnson, P.2d , Case No. 18021 
(January 14, 1981), this Court stated that it: 
• • • must view the evidence properly 
presented at trial in the light Most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, and will 
onlv interfere when the evidence is so 
lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable man could not possibly have 
reached a verdict beyond a reasonable 
doubt. • • • [Tt must] also view in a 
light most favorable to the jury's ver~ict 
those facts which can be reasonably 
inferren from the evidence presented to 
it. 
-3-
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Id. at 2 (Rmphasis added). Ree also: State v. Mccardell, 
ntah, fi52 P.2d 942, q45 (1~82). 
More recently, this standard was again stated in 
state v. Petree, Case No. 18015 (Utah, February 4, 1983) in 
which the Court held: 
We reverse a jury conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained~a~ 
reasonable doubt •••• [citations 
omitted] (emphasis adned). 
In Petree, the Court's majority believed, following 
a review of the facts of the case, that even the most 
exaggerated stretch within reason could not close the gap 
between any and all inferences which could be drawn by the 
jury and the jury's guilty verdict. In the case at bar, 
however, there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict. 
The only requirement therefore in reviewing 
sufficiency of the evidence claims under Mccardell and its 
progeny is that when the facts are viewed in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict, there simply must be found a 
sufficient amount of evidence supporting the judgment of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Appellant contends that the evidence leaning to his 
conviction was insufficient since the victim, Mr. Hunter, 
could not identify appellant; the photoqraphs were not 
-4-
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clear enough to ascertain appellant's alleqed tatoos on his 
arm; ana the photographs, when anmitted into evidence, were 
not first subMitted to the jury for its viewing. Appellant's 
claims taken either separately or cumulatively are of no 
consequence when juxtaposen tn the sufficient evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict. 
With respect to appellant's first point concerning 
the supposed requirement that a conviction should be 
overturnea in light of the victim's inability to identify him, 
there simply is nothing (either statutorily or precedentially) 
to support this groundless claim. Adopting appellant's victim 
identification rule would not only emasculate murder and 
manslaughter cases-in-chief, but also completely eliminate 
convictions in those areas as well. ~he victim of the 
robbery, Hunter, testified that appellant was wearing a vest 
(T. lnl), a fact which is borne out by the photographs from 
the camera which was activated when appellant opened the cash 
register The reason Hunter was unable to positively iaentify 
appellant as one of the robbers was his exclusive 
concentration in placing the drugs in the bag (T. 161). 
Positive identification of appellant as one of the 
pharmacy robbers was made by appellant's parole officer, 
however, who testified that he had known appellant since 1979 
and who identified appellant as the man \·rho was reaching into 
the cash register (as depicted by the photographs of the 
-5-
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robbery) and identified appellant as the man sitting at the 
defendant's table at trial (T. 168-170). In addition, the 
jury, when it retired to consider the evidence, were allowed, 
because of the admitted photographs, to make an independent 
comparison of the features of the robber of the cash register 
with the features of the defendant on trial and therefore 
could conclude that appellant had robbed the Southeast 
Pharmacy (See F,xhibits 8-21). 
Appellant's next contention relating to the quality 
of the photographs and the victim's resulting inability to 
identify his supposed arm tattoos is a trivial point. nefense 
counsel introduced no evidence indicating that appellant had 
the alleged tattoos during the time of the robbery. 
Appellant's identification was obtained through the testimony 
of his former parole officer, who was familiar with his 
features to such an extent that he had no a if f icul ty 
whatsoever in identifying appellant as one of the pharmacy 
robbers ('T'. 38-40). 
Appellant's final contention that the photographs 
were not directly shown to the jury lacks merit as well. 
During the Pnrole officer's testimony, in which the parole 
officer identified appellant as one of the robbers who was 
photographed, the prosecutor asked the parole officer to 
indicate to the jury the person he had just identified in the 
photograph (T. 18-~Q). This procedure was followed twice 
-6-
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('r'. 18-3'1). Moreover, all of the photographs were admittec1 
into evidence and both prosecution and defense counsel, during 
closing .arguMent, encouragen the jury to once again scrutinize 
the photographs {~. 195-?.06). Apparently, not only were the 
photographs of the robbery conclusive evidence tying appellant 
to the crimes charged, but so was the parole officer's 
testimony positively iaentifying his former parolee clearly 
photographed during the commission of his crimes of aggravatea 
robbery and the possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person. 
P0IMT II 
TRF:RF WAS ST1F'F'ICIRf'1'"':" EV!DF.:NCr. F0R TPP 
'!'RIAL JUDGE TO C.IVP. THP. FLI(;P'J:' n1S"'!"'RUCTI()T-.J 
'!10 THF. JTJRY. 
Appellant's final contention centers on the trial 
judge's giving of the flight instruction to the jury. 
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evinence to 
support the instruction. The nature of the particular 
instruction in this case merely makes flight an evi<lentiary 
consideration in the jury's determination of guilt. In light 
of case law defining flight, appellant's claim of prejudicial 
error cannot be sustained. 
In People v. Cannadv, lns Cal. Rptr. 129, 501 P.2d 
585 er.al. 1972), the defendants arqnerl that the evidence 
-7-
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din not warrant the giving of a flight instruction which was 
virtually identical to the one given in the case at bar.I 
There the court held that the jury could reasonably infer that 
defendant's flight reflected consciousness of guilt from the 
evidence presented at trial. mhe court went on to state: 
Flight requires neither the physical act 
of running nor the reaching of a far-away 
haven. ~he evidence is sufficient to 
support the giving of the instruction. 
5 01 P. 2d at 59 1 • 
was: 
In the instant case the instruction read to the jury 
The flight or attempted flight of a person 
immediately after the commission of a 
crime or after he is accused of a crime 
that has been committed, is not sufficient 
in itself to establish hi8 guilt, but is a 
fact which, if proven, may be considered 
by you in the light of all other proven 
facts in deciding the question of his 
guilt or innocence. ,,.,he weight to which 
lThe Cannady instruction read: 
The flight of a person immediately after 
the commission of a crime, or after he is 
accused of a crime that has been 
committed, is not sufficient in itself to 
establish his guilt, but is a fact which, 
if proved, may be considered by you in the 
liqht of all other prove0 facts in 
deciding the question of his guilt or 
innocence. 'J"he weight to which such 
circumstance is entitled is a matter for 
the jury to deterine. 
-n-
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such circumstance is entitled is a matter 
for the jurv to determine. 
~ou are further instructed that flight 
affords a hnsis for an inference of 
consciousness of '1 uilt and constitutes an 
implied admission (:R .• 94). 
The nklahoma courts have approved the givinq of similar flight 
instructions. See Ward v. state, 444 P.2rl 25S (Okl. Crim. 
19 6 8 ) and Pv 1 e s v • state , 4 R 3 P • 2 d 11 n 5 ( n k 1 • r.r i m. 1 q 71 ) • 
The Washington Supreme Court in an earlier case 
offered a liberal definition of what is meant by "flight." rn· 
State v. Wilson, 174 P.2d 55~ (Wash. lq4fi) the Court 
explained: 
Id. 
TO constitute flight it is not necessary 
that there should be an escape from jail 
or froM an officer, but it may consist in 
a departure from the place of the crime by 
one conscious of gult even before 
suspected of the crime. 
Later, the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. 
Aubuchon, 3"-1 S.W.~d 3/.7 (196S), stated: 
'r'he term "flight" denotes the act of 
leaving the scene or vicinity of the 
crime, and the act of flight may be shown 
on the issue of guilt. 
I~. at 335. See also: State v. Ward, SlR S.W.2d 6R~, ~Rq 
(Mo. App. 1()75). 
-9-
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Instructions, as the one given in this case, assume 
neither the quilt nor innocence of the defendant. See People 
v. naener, 96 Cal. App. 2d R27, R32-R33, 216 P.2d 511, 514 
(1950). ~hus, the flight instruction as it was given by the 
trial judge in this case, is qenerally interpreted as simply 
leaving the scene of a crime and is a factor, if proven at 
trial, which should be considered by the jury. Flight, with 
nothing more, is circumstantially insufficient to sustain a 
guilty vernict. Instruction No. 19 did not contain this 
prejudicial defect, but rather contained the necessary caveats 
to guara against any misguiden conclusions which the jury 
might have drawn as to what evidence of flight there was. 
Mr. Runter testified that following the robbery, 
appellant left the pharmacy and thus there was sufficient 
evidence to support both the flight instruct ion and the 
reasonable inference that departure from the place of the 
crime could constitute "flight" (~. 151). 
A.ssurrting arguendo that the trial court did err in 
instructing the jury as to flight, the error still does not 
approach the degree of substantiality which would justify 
reversal of appellant's conviction in this case. 
:Rule 3n of the Utah Pules of Criminal Procedure 
states , in pertinent pa rt: 
Any error, defect, irreqularity or 
variance which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a partv ·S"KaTl be 
Clisregarde~. --
-10-
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ntah r.o<1e of CriMinal Procedure, E; 7'7-~5-30( a) (Supp. 1Q81) • 
This stanoard has been applied by this Court in 0rteqa v • 
'J'homas, 14 ntah 2d 2Q6, 3~3 P.2d 40fi (19~1). In Ortega, the 
court, in considering alleged errors contained in jury 
instruct ions, inter al ia, held: 
In order to justify reversal, the 
appellant must show error that was 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense 
there is at least a reasonable likelihood 
that in the absence of the error the 
result would have been different. 
It is therefore incumbent upon appellant to 
demonstrate that but for the defective instruction, the jury 
would have reached a different conclusion. Appellant has 
failed to carry this burden and therefore, even assuming error 
on the part of the trial judge in giving the instruction, such 
error was harmless. 
POINT III 
APPEI.1LAWT1 ' S FAILING TO COMPLY WI'I':P TJT~.H 
RTJLE s OF CIVIL PROCP.nURF,, 7 S( p) (?) (a) 
roNS'T.'ITtTTRS A SEPARAT:P AND INDEPENDENT 
BASIS FOR AFFIRMANCR OF HIS cnNVICTION. 
Appellant ignores the requirement that his hrief, 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, '7S(p)(2)(d), must 
contain " ••• a concise statement of the material facts of 
the case citinq the pages of the record supporting such 
statement." 
-11-
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This Court, in State v. Tucker, Case No. 17944 
(December 29, 1982), recently held: 
Id. 
A separate ana independent basis for the 
af firMance of the trial court is that the 
defenaant failen to refer to any portion 
of the record that factually supports his 
contentions on appeal. This court will 
assume the correctness of the judqrnent 
below if counsel on appeal does not comply 
with the requirements of Rule ;5 ••• as 
to making a concise statement of facts and 
citation of the pages in the record where 
they are supported. 
In light of appellant's failure to make such 
citations, this Court should affirm hi~ conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant seeks reversal of his conviction on the 
grounds that the victim could not positively identify him as 
the pharmacy robber, the photographs nepicting a period of 
time during his crimes were of such low quality tht positive 
identification of him as one of the rohhers was impossible, 
the photographs were not submitted properly for the jury's 
perusal, and finally the flight instruction could not be 
sustained by the evidence. Victim identification is not an 
essential factor in the prosecutor's case-in-chief in light of 
other means leading to positive identification such as a 
parole officer identifyinq appellant as the photographed 
-1 /.-
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phar~acy robber. ~he jury did observe the photographs on 
several occasions during the course of the trial, and took the 
photographs when they retired to deliberate. There was 
sufficient evidence to the effect that appellant had departed 
from the pharmacy which was sufficient to support the trial 
judqe's flight in5truction. In light of this evidentiary 
support, respondent urqes this Court to affirm appellant's 
convictions ana sentences. 
'Respectfully suhmi tted this J;;{ day of_ February, 
1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSot1 
Attorney General 
General 
CBRTIFICA~B OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailen three true ana exact 
copies of the foregoing Rrief, postage prepaid, to Lynn R. 
Brown, Attorney for Appellnnt, Salt Lake Legal nefender 
Assoc., 3~3 South 200 F.ast, Salt Lake City, ntah, 84111, this 
day of February, 1QR3. 
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